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Many critics of Americas public education system hail parental or school choice, a
program that allows public school systems to compete against one another and, un-
der some proposals, against private educational institutions, for students and educa-
tional funding, as the answer to Americas educational crisis. Proponents argue that
competition will force public schools to offer students a quality education or close.
This article does not evaluate the claims of the parental-choice proposals; rather, it
examines the difficulties inherent in funding such a system through traditional school
finance mechanisms.
Allowing parents to determine where their children will attend school — which
some believe can contribute to the solution of the crisis in U.S. education 1 —
undermines local control of a school system. States traditionally pay for public
schools through local property taxes. 2 While detractors criticize the property tax for
generating inequities in the distribution of education dollars, 3 supporters claim that
the benefits of local control over education outweigh its inequities. 4 A parental-
choice program, however, vests control over education not with any particular local-
ity, but with an individual. Without local control, it becomes difficult to justify
traditional educational financing.
The rationalization for parental-choice programs also clashes with funding mecha-
nisms established to secure educational equity. The highest courts of several states
have deemed traditional financing mechanisms unconstitutional, 5 holding that the
right to educational equity outweighs the benefits of local control. 6 Under a choice
program, competition provides the incentive for school districts to improve. Because
this necessarily implies that some school districts will fare better than others, states
which recognize a right to educational equity must be concerned with the education
at those schools which fare poorly under such a program.
This article examines the parental-choice program as enacted in Massachusetts.
It next turns to court decisions citing local control over educational systems as the
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justification for a state's educational funding system and shows that parental choice
undermines local control over education. It then examines the right to educational
equity found in several state constitutions and the effect a choice program will have
on educational equity. Finally, it concludes that legislatures should be wary of enact-
ing school-choice programs without corresponding reform in educational financing.
I. School Choice
The term "school choice" encompasses a broad range of programs, including (1) in-
terdistrict choice programs, which allow a student to attend any school within the
student's community, 7 (2) voucher programs, in which the government provides a
student with an educational voucher that the student may redeem at any public or
private school at the government's expense, 8 and (3) specialty schools, where stu-
dents attend a particular institution in the school district in order to specialize in
fine arts, languages, and so forth. 9 Rather than discuss theoretical reform proposals,
I discuss school choice as adopted in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts program
differs slightly from each of these, but most closely resembles a voucher program.
The commonwealth's program allows any student to attend a public school outside
the youngster's own district at the expense of the district in which the student lives. 10
The place where the student resides is termed the "sending" district; the place where
the student attends school is termed the "receiving" district. Presently ten states allow
this type of choice program, 11 including Massachusetts. 12 The legislature enacted the
Massachusetts program in the spring of 1991; the first students participated in the
program during the 1991-1992 school year.
Massachusetts's school-choice program is rooted in Milton Friedman's Capitalism
and Freedom, 13 in which Friedman argues that government-sponsored schools should
be allowed to compete with private schools for education dollars. Currently, private
and public schools can compete only on a limited basis. Parents who choose to send
their children to private school must bear the cost of their child's education in addi-
tion to paying taxes that finance the public schools. Friedman proposes a system un-
der which every child would receive a voucher redeemable for an education at any
institution the government approves. 14 Schools would compete for students. Parents
would choose only the best schools for their children, encouraging schools to provide
better education. Parents who wish to provide more education for their children than
the voucher buys might supplement it with additional funds.
Members of the Republican Party, especially Ronald Reagan and George Bush,
have expounded on the virtues of school choice. When Bush announced his intention
to be remembered as the "education president," he made school choice a central
focus of his plan. 15
Under the Massachusetts school-choice program, any student may choose to leave
his or her home district to attend public school in another district. Although a school
district may vote not to accept students under the program, it cannot vote to keep all
its students within the district. 16 Once it chooses to participate, a district may decide
how many students it will accept, based on available space, but may not discriminate
in admissions. This prohibition extends to discrimination based on race, color, relig-
ious creed, national origin, sex, age, ancestry, athletic performance, physical handi-
cap, special need or academic performance, or proficiency in the English language. 17
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When a child chooses to attend school outside the home district, the sending dis-
trict becomes responsible for paying tuition to the receiving district. 18 The tuition
charge equals the average per pupil expenditure at the receiving district. 19 Because
students do not leave high-spending districts to attend classes in low-spending dis-
tricts,
20 the sending school pays more to the receiving district than the receiving dis-
trict would have spent had the child stayed in the home district. Some of the
problems resulting from this financing mechanism are explored further below. 21
Normally, a school district must provide transportation to all students residing
more than two miles from school. 22 Students participating in the school choice pro-
gram are responsible for their own transportation to the receiving district school. 23
II. Local Control as Justification for Educational Funding Systems
That parental choice undercuts local control over the educational system does not
mean that such parental choice plans contain flaws. Educators must debate the
relative virtues of local control and parental choice. Rather, local control serves as
the justification for present educational funding mechanisms. If one removed local
control as a justification, one should also reconsider the funding mechanism.
The Supreme Court, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 24 explains how
local control justifies using local property taxes to finance public education. 25 The
plaintiffs in Rodriguez challenge Texas's educational funding system under the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Plaintiffs
claimed that funding the school system through a tax on property created disparities
between school districts and, consequently, deprived them of an equal education, to
which the Constitution entitled them.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by deciding that the Texas financing system
would not be subject to strict scrutiny. 26 Under a "strict scrutiny" test, the Court in-
validates a statute unless a state demonstrates a compelling interest in retaining the
statute as written.
27
Traditionally, the Court reviews a state's laws strictly when those
laws prejudice those "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process."28 The Court held that those living in districts without a large property-tax
base constituted too "large, diverse, and amorphous" a class to be the object of judi-
cial protection. 29
Strictly judicial scrutiny applies not only to laws infringing on certain groups,
but also on laws infringing on certain fundamental rights. 30 Plaintiffs also contended
that education, like voting, travel, and other rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
established a fundamental right. Because the Texas system of financing education
detracted from their ability to receive a quality education, it should be subject to
strict scrutiny. The Court also rejected this argument, holding that although impor-
tant, education did not rise to the level of a fundamental right under the federal Con-
stitution. Such status remained reserved for those rights expressly protected within
the Constitution itself. 31
Concluding that the Texas school-financing system should not be subjected to
strict or heightened scrutiny, the Court then proceeded to analyze the Texas statute
under traditional equal protection doctrine, which requires only that the statute be
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rationally related to a legitimate state purpose to be valid. 32 The Court found that
local control of the educational system constituted a valid state purpose and that the
Texas funding system related rationally to this purpose. For this reason, the Court
found the Texas system of financing constitutional. 33
State courts also endorse local control over education as a legitimate justification
for allowing cities and towns to raise revenues at the local level. 34 Different courts
recognize different aspects of local control as legitimate, including: local control over
educational content; 35 local control over educational spending; 36 and local control
over municipal spending priorities. 37
Courts acknowledge that students living in different communities possess varying
educational needs. The residents of a particular municipality, rather than a state, are
better able to shape a school's curricula to its students' needs. Parents living within a
community feel strongly about the way their local schools are run and thus ensure
that they are well managed. One court stated:
Traditionally, not only in Idaho but throughout most of the states of the Union,
the legislature has left the establishment, control and management of the school to
the parents and taxpayers in the community which it serves. The local residents or-
ganized the school district pursuant to enabling legislation, imposed taxes upon
themselves, built their own school house, elected their own trustees and through
them managed their own school. It was under these circumstances that the "Little
Red School House" became an American conception of freedom in education, and
in local control of institutions of local concern. In the American concept, there is
no greater right to the supervision of the education of the child than that of the
parent. In no other hands could it be safer.
The American people made a wise choice early in their history by not only cre-
ating a forty-eight-state system of education, but also by retaining within the com-
munity control of the educational program. This tradition of community
administration is a firmly accepted and deeply rooted policy.
Another legitimate reason for local control over education is that cities and towns
can, for themselves, decide how to balance educational expenditures against expendi-
tures for other public services. Local control allows individual cities and towns to de-
termine on which services local tax dollars are spent. "Some communities might
place heavy emphasis on schools, while others may desire greater police or fire pro-
tection, or improved streets or public transportation."39 These communities are al-
lowed to reflect these decisions by determining how much of their tax dollar to spend
on education.
Finally, local control of education also allows a municipality to determine at what
level it chooses to tax its residents. Similar to choosing which public services a mu-
nicipality values most highly, local control of education and other services allows a
municipality to decide whether it values public services enough to tax its residents.
Locals may decide that money is better left in individual hands, with minimal spend-
ing on services. The New York Court of Appeals states:
Throughout the State, voters, by their action on school budgets, exercise a substan-
tial control over the educational opportunities made available in their districts; to
the extent that an authorized budget requires expenditures in excess of State aid,
which will be funded by local taxes, there is a direct correlation between the sys-
tem of local school financing and implementation of the desires of the taxpayer.
40
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States justify the use of educational funding mechanisms that create disparities
in local districts as a means of providing local control over local schools. Many
courts have upheld these funding systems, declaring them rationally related to legiti-
mate legislative ends. 41 The school-choice program, however, undercuts the locality's
control over educational content, over educational spending, and over its tax dollars.
If the rationale behind allowing a school finance system that generates education
resides in local control over education, one cannot simultaneously rationalize a
school-choice program which forces municipalities to surrender funds to neigh-
boring school districts.
Under the Massachusetts school-choice program, school districts may vote to
accept students into its schools. The right to leave a local school district to attend
another school, however, does not depend on the school district, but belongs to
"every child in the Commonwealth."42 A locality may not vote to keep all its stu-
dents within its schools. Although it may choose not to participate in the school-
choice program by admitting students, a school district may participate to the extent
that it must allow its students to attend classes in other districts.43
The philosophy behind this program directly contradicts each of the versions
of local control outlined above. First, localities lose control over the content of a
student's education. While local control of a school system allows a municipality to
determine the content of a student's education, the municipality loses this ability as
soon as a student leaves its school district. Once a child chooses to attend another
school district, that district's school committee takes charge of the curriculum,
graduation requirements, and so on.44 Although parents gain control over the con-
tent of their child's education, in that they determine where their child will attend
school, parental control over education does not justify a system of local financing
of education.
Second, localities lose control over the cost of a child's education. Because of the
structure of the Massachusetts school-choice program, a sending district must pay the
receiving district the cost of educating the student in the receiving school. 45 Because
students do not leave high-spending schools to attend lower-spending schools,46 this
means that the sending school district has to spend more on education than it would
otherwise choose to do. This comes at the expense of other public services the local-
ity has chosen to maintain.47
Finally, the sending school district, if a significant percentage of its students
choose to leave its system, loses control over its taxing decisions. To the extent that
the receiving school district's tuition rate exceeds that of the sending school, the send-
ing district is forced to raise its taxes to make up any difference between its level of
spending and that of the receiving district.48 Of course, the sending school could, and
probably will, choose to take these funds from the existing school budget, decreasing
the funds available to everyone else. This action has a comparable effect. Rather than
choosing to increase taxes to maintain the same level of services, the community has
simply chosen to maintain the same tax burden and decrease services. In either case,
the taxpayers lose control over the level of services they choose to provide. These
taxpayers, then, have no control over the school budget for which they are paying.
One must bear in mind why the issue of local control of education is central to
this analysis. The state constitution does not condemn the school-choice program
because it constrains local control of education. The state constitution vests the
state with responsibility for education.49 The state could choose to bring all the local
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school districts under its direct control without violating the mandates of the con-
stitution. Local control, rather, figures centrally in justifying the present financing
mechanism for education. 50 The legislative goal of providing local control of educa-
tion justifies a funding system that generates disparities throughout the state. The
school-choice program, however, severely undermines the legislative purpose of local
control of education. Under the program, a municipality may lose control of the
content of a student's education, of the funding of a student's education, and of its
own tax rate.
Because it advocates local control of education, the legislature need not remove
itself completely from the educational sphere. Legislative pronouncements on school
curriculum, mandatory attendance, the length of the school day and school year, are
all valid under a system whose purpose is to provide local control of education. 51
Although these regulations detract from local control, they are of a qualitatively
different nature than the school-choice program.
First, legislative regulations are the product of legislative debate. All localities
participate, through their representatives, in the state's legislature and have equal
opportunity to participate in the formation of these rules. Under the school-choice
program, the decision as to how school dollars are spent no longer rests with the
sending district, as confined by legislative pronouncements; it becomes the decision
of another district, whose actions are completely independent of the sending district.
Second, legislative regulation is a limiting factor on local control of education.
School choice fundamentally contradicts the notion of local control of education.
Legislative regulation sets boundaries within which a municipality may act as it
chooses, providing the level and type of education it deems appropriate. Under
school choice, the boundaries are reversed; the choice program mandates that a
locality shall have no voice over any aspect of some (or all) of its residents, even
though the locality pays for their education.
III. School Choice and Educational Equity
Not only those states which have upheld local funding as a constitutional method of
financing education, but also those which have rejected the traditional school-funding
system must consider the implications of adopting a choice program. The program
works well only if school districts compete against one another for students and
funding. Absent any differences among schools, there is no competition. Acknowl-
edging that differences exist, however, may be an admission that because the quality
of a student's education depends on where he or she attends school, the system vio-
lates a student's rights to educational equity.
State courts have overturned educational funding systems both because the fund-
ing system conflicted with the equal protection clause of the state constitution 52
and because the funding system violated the right to an education guaranteed by the
state constitution. 53 In Serrano v. Priest, 54 the California Supreme Court found that
the state's method of funding education violated the state's equal protection clause.
Unlike the Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez, the California court found that
students living in property-poor school districts constituted a suspect class. Because
the financing system burdened this class, the court subjected it to strict scrutiny. For
the system to be constitutional, it needed to fulfill a compelling state purpose.
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The court found that local control of education did not constitute a compelling
state purpose. 55 As structured, the system actually frustrated the objective of pro-
viding individual cities and towns control over their educational systems. 56 While
property-rich districts could afford to provide the quality of education they chose,
property-poor districts did not enjoy the same options. Unlike rich districts, poor
districts were confined in the amount of money they would raise for education. The
funding system, according to the California court, did not allow individual districts
to control education.
Other states, rather than finding that students in property-poor districts con-
stituted a suspect class, subjected school-financing laws to strict scrutiny because
they infringed upon a fundamental right to education guaranteed by their state's con-
stitution.
57 When subjected to strict scrutiny, state courts found no compelling state
interest in a local school-financing system. The result in such a case, where a court
relies on the state's equal protection clause in conjunction with a constitutional educa-
tion clause to overturn a school financing system, differs from the result in a case
where a court overturns a funding system based only on the state's equal protection
clause. While a court protects a student's right to an equal education when acting
under an equal protection clause alone, a court protects a student's right to a thor-
ough and efficient education only when protecting a fundamental right.
This distinction becomes significant when discussing a school-choice program.
For such a program to succeed, schools must compete against one another for
students and dollars. Because school funding will follow students from district to
district, those schools which attract more students will have more money to spend
than those which attract fewer students. While this is the result choice proponents
favor, it may violate a student's right to an equal education. In those states which
guarantee each student an equal education, this system cannot succeed. By creating
a system that works only if schools differ in quality, a legislature acknowledges that
some children will not receive as good an education as some others.
Most states, however, do not recognize a student's right to an equal education, but
only to a certain base level of education. While moving money from one district to
another may vary the quality of education an individual receives at a school, in order
to violate a state constitution the degradation in the student's education would have
to be so great that it fails to meet the minimal constitutional criteria.
One might respond that although students may be guaranteed a quality education
over the course of twelve years in a school system, they are not guaranteed that in
any one particular year they will receive an education comparable to that which they
might have received had they chosen to attend another school. Because they can
change schools if they are dissatisfied with the education they receive, their right to
an education is protected. This fits nicely with the economists' view of competition.
While in the short run a system may generate inefficiencies, in the long run the mar-
ket is efficient.
These short-run problems are, however, quite significant. A child is in school only
for twelve years. If that child fails to learn how to read in the first grade, he or she
will not necessarily be able to learn how in the second. If a student chose a bad
school one year, there is no guarantee that his or her next choice will be better than
the first. In fact, it is likely that if a child and her or his parents cared little enough
about the education to pick a bad school in the first place, together they will either
make another bad choice or choose to stay with the bad school.
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While in either case a legislature must consider the impact of adopting a school-
choice program in the educational financing system, the chances of creating an un-
constitutional system are far greater where a constitution guarantees educational
equality than where it simply guarantees a base level of education. These problems
will not resolve themselves through "competition," as school-choice advocates hope.
The education market differs from the "free" market in many ways.
Milton Friedman developed the "market rationale" behind the school-choice move-
ment early in the 1960s. 58 The school-choice program, advocates contend, will foster
competition between school districts. Schools unable to attract students will not
receive public funds, which will force them to improve their programs. As they im-
prove, they will attract more students.59
Advocates contend that schools with inferior educational programs will lose
students to schools with superior educational programs. This means that schools
which begin with less money will lose money to schools which began in a relatively
stronger position. Although this will generate incentive for the weaker schools to
improve their programs, they will be left without the means to accomplish their end.
Poorer schools will attempt to enrich their educational programs at the same time
as they are losing funds to their competitors. Faced with a similar situation, a busi-
ness might choose one of several options. It might decide to invest new capital
and radically alter the way in which it does business. With new capital or a new
marketing plan, the business, better able to compete, will win back customers and
stay in the market. A public school, of course, cannot do this. Municipalities cannot
borrow funds to pay short-term expenses.60
Simply amending the law to allow municipalities to borrow funds will not solve
this problem. A private company that attempts a comeback — and fails — is respon-
sible for its debts. The consumer loses nothing. This is not true of a city or town. If
a school district borrows funds to improve its educational program and is still unable
to attract students, it cannot simply go bankrupt. 61 The town is still responsible for
the debt of the school district.
School districts face another problem that businesses in the free market will never
encounter. If a businessman produces a mediocre article at low cost and a competitor
produces a better version at a higher cost, the first businessman never has to pay for
the customer's purchase from the competitor. Although the businessman may lose
customers' trade, he is not required to ensure that customers acquire the competitor's
product. But that is exactly what sending school districts must do. If a student
chooses to leave a school district, that district must pay for that student to attend a
school elsewhere. Unlike most goods sold on the market, the consumer in this situ-
ation has a protected right to receive quality merchandise, and the government has
the responsibility to ensure that the consumer receives this "merchandise."
Once it begins to lose students, a school starts down the slippery slope toward
extinction. It will lose funds. Its programs will suffer and it will lose more students,
leading to a larger loss of funds. One would expect the cycle to end with all the stu-
dents leaving. But this will not happen. Some children will continue to attend their
community schools, no matter how bad they become. This might be because they
cannot afford transportation to a neighboring school district, because neither they nor
their parents care enough about their education to leave their school district for an-
other, or simply because the local school is convenient. These are the students who
will suffer under the choice program.
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Proponents argue that the effects on poorer school districts will not be this drastic.
Although schools are losing money, they are also losing students. The district is left
with unchanged average expenditures.
There are several problems with this argument. The first, which concerns the
structure of the Massachusetts program, could be solved. Sending school districts
are forced to pay receiving school districts the latter's average per pupil cost. This
means that sending districts will usually lose more than their average per pupil
cost when a student leaves its school. Therefore the average per pupil cost for the
remaining students will decrease.
Much more difficult to correct, however, are the effects of marginal cost. When a
receiving school adds one pupil to its enrollment lists, its costs do not increase by the
per pupil average cost. The receiving school already has a building, a school super-
intendent, a school principal, and may even have, if few enough students enroll
through the choice program, sufficient teachers to educate more students. When a
student leaves a sending school, however, it does not save the per pupil average cost
of educating that student. It must continue to employ a superintendent, heat the build-
ing, and so on. If enough students leave, it may be able to reduce its teaching costs. 62
This means that schools which receive students under the choice program can use
the extra tuition funds to expand offerings to all their students. Such offerings make
a school even more appealing, allowing it to attract more students. The sending
school, however, will be forced to eliminate programs for all its students, making
it less attractive for those who remain. One school superintendent noted that the
money his school sent to another school district under the choice program was used
to fund foreign language classes and a lacrosse team; at the same time, his school
was forced to eliminate its foreign language classes. 63
While legislatures search for ways to improve the quality of education students re-
ceive, they must bear in mind the constitutional implications of their actions. While
a school-choice program may provide one method of heightening educational quality,
through competition for students and educational dollars, such a program, unless ac-
companied by a corresponding reform in traditional methods of school funding, may
run counter to existing constitutional decisions.
Applying free market rationale to distribute scarce resources can be quite efficient.
Competition between businesses ensures that prices remain at a tolerable level and
that the market provides quality goods. Education, however, should not be considered
a scarce resource. State constitutions guarantee each child a basic level of education
and vest the responsibility for providing this education in state legislatures. The legis-
latures must not abandon their responsibility to the whim of the market. **-
This article was written prior to the passage of the Massachusetts Education
Reform Act of 1993. However nothing in the act invalidates or contradicts the
author's argument.
In March 1994, in the nation's most dramatic shift in a century in the way public
schools are financed, Michigan voters approved a plan to use sales and other taxes,
not property taxes, to pay for its 3,286 schools.
All told, twenty-eight states are in state courts over the way they finance public
education. In most cases, civil rights groups and coalitions ofparents have alleged
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that state aid to supplement property taxes does not close the gap between rich
schools and poor ones.
In the case of Michigan, the consequences of its initiative on educational stand-
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